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"Preliminary !Draft 
Any revolution from above is inevitably 
revolution by dictatorship and despotism. 
(Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 1849) 
Western .historiography .on-Stalin - a d  .Stalinism: has -beenidriven in 
.-recent .years by' fundamental disagreements:on -the -role:of:the dictator,.. the 
-.scale larid.-purpose. of'2the Great *Purges, :and-- the nature. of .the. Stalinist state. 
.iJ.ust.,as ;the imagery. of totalitarianism .obscuredcimportant-sources: of
-resistance .and .autonomy within Soviet society +and.;homogenized -the 
:differences' between fascism.. and Stalinism,. so 'the' '.!revisionist" .diminution of 
.:the. central :figure=of Sta1in;has:cast -discussion in :unfruitful. directions. An 
.apolitical, social :lustoryy-has,attimes.. confronted older:,historians still 
.~comniitted to a clargely~political-;.interpretation. a d..anxious~that.:the-moral 
:indictment of Stalin :not - be. softened. The renormity*of ;thef:human losses i n  
:the collectivization-drives, the-subsequent .famine, and-:the.purges.,have 
$made-cooler, .:detached assessments suspect, and .theibattles"have -moved ?.to 
<the ..slippery .-grgunds .of sources where one side ,decries :,the -heavy aeliancei on 
-?memoirs, .!rumor, :rand 'hearsay, :and the--other condemns-:naive readings of 
;,official- statements. 
.Where normal .conventions of historical writing are sometimes 
suspended becauselof the'frustration with adequate-evidence, :a .powerful 
tendency has. emerged that weaves a relatively-consistent, organic narrative 
emphasizing .the intentionality and constancy of thefprograms. and policies of 
the 1930s. Here the particular psychopathology of Stalin and his project to 
create a personal, autocratic regime and expand state power throughout 
society provides a unifying theme. This interpretation, most .eloquently 
restated in the second volume of Robert C. Tucker's biography of Stalin,l 
1. Robert 'C. Tucker, S t a h  m Power: The Re . . volution from Above. 1928- 
194'1 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990). 
has been challenged by a number of monographs and articles that have 
tended to deconstruct the explanation derived from a single purpose by a 
single mind and elaborate a picture of unrelieved confusion, contradiction, 
false starts, improvisation, and swings from policies of negotiation and 
reconciliation to desperate resorts to repression, violence, and terror. 2 
Though there is general agreement that Stalin intended to create a powerful 
state able to carry out a radical program of social transformation, the 
revisionists hold that there were no blueprints pre-existing in Stalin's mind, 
that other players had significant even if subordinate roles, and that Stalin's 
personal power was not as great as usually imagined. -Here the imperatives 
of.governing and the deep structures of RussianJSoviet society limited what 
the state could do and forced it to shift .gears, turn' back, a t  times accelerate 
or resort to ever more radical methods. State actors-had to resp~nd to the 
chaos to which their own policies gave risesa3 These discussions, as Geoff 
Eley has noted, "bear an uncanny resemblance" to the debates in the 1960s- 
1970s between the "intentionalists" and the "structuralists" among German 
2. For a discussion of the "new cohort" of revisionist -historians, see the 
series of articles around Sheila -Fitzpatrick "New Perspectives on Stalinism," 
The~Russian &view, XLV, 4 (October 1986), pp. 357-373, by Stephen F. 
Cohen, Geoff Eley, Peter Kenez, and Alfred G. Meyer, .with-asreply by 
Fitzpatrick, in ibid., pp. 375-413; and by Daniel Field,'Daniel R. Brower, 
William Chase, Robert Conquest, J .  Arch Getty, Jerry-F. Hough, 'Hiroaki 
Kuromiya, Roberta T. Manning, Alec Nove, Gabor Tamas Rittersporn, 
Robert C. Tucker, and Lynne Viola, ibid., XLVI, 4 (October 1987), pp. 375- 
431. 
3. "Evidence of high-level confusion, counterproductive initiatives, and .lack 
of control over events has not supported the notion of a grand design." [J. 
Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Partv 
Reconsidered, 1933- 1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19851, 
p. 2031 See also, Gabor T. Rittersporn, 
4. Geoff Eley, "History with the Politics Left Out -- Again?" The Russian 
Review, XLV, 4 (October 1986), p. 387. For a review of the German 
historiography, see Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and 
Perspectives of Intewetation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985). 
One of the pioneers of Soviet social history of the Stalin period, Moshe 
Lewin, has managed to sit out -much of the infighting between the Stalin- 
centered and Stalin-reducing historians while shifting the state-centered 
focus of the Cold War consensus and simultaneously engaging social 
structures and developments, traditional and revolutionary cultures, 
. political interventions, and their mutual determination. A radical break 
with the totalitarian model's nearly exclusive concern with the political 
sphere, Lewin's work opened the field to social history and placed political 
actors within a larger, limiting context.. 'From his .Lenin's Last Strug& 
through the essays collected in The Making of the Soviet Svstem, he 
emphasized the dynamic shifts in Soviet history that'belied the fatalism of 
continuity theories linking Leninism forward with Stalinism and backward 
to an unproblematized Russian political culture. Here there were different 
'Leninisms, various potential outcomes of the New Economic Policy, .and 
contradictions and unforeseen complexities within the Stalinist system. 
The deceptively simple question to be answered in this paper is: how 
did Stalin rule? How did he maintain his authority while establishing a 
personal autocracy? His extraordinary and brutal ,political achievement was 
to act in. the name of the Communist party and its central committee 
against that party and central committee, while remaining the unchallenged 
,head of. party and state and, evidently, a vastly. popular leader. .At the end 
of the-process his absolute grip on power allowed him to declare black white 
and completely reverse the 'foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the line of 
the Comintern by embracing Nazi Germany in a non-aggression pact. The 
colossal and costly destruction he brought upon the country on the eve and 
in the early days of the Second World War gave rise to no organized 
opposition, and the centralized apparatus of control that he had created was 
not only able to weather the Nazi invasion but to organize a victory that 
would preserve the essence of the. system he forged for another half century. 
The simplest, though inadequate, answer to the question, would be 
that Stalin's power was maintained through the exercise of terror and 
monopolistic control of the means of communication throughout society. 
Though certainly an important part of the answer, a focus on terror and 
propaganda does not explain how Stalin won his authority within the party 
and maintained it among his own supporters who never attempted to free 
themselves from the source of their fears. Terror operated through 
collaboration. It was supported by many within and outside the party who 
believed that extraordinary means against vicious and hidden enemies were 
required. To the end of his life Stalin was regarded by tens of millions as 
the indispensable leader of the "socialist" camp, perhaps someone to'be 
feared as was Ivan,groznvi, a leader who put fear in the hearts of enemies. 
Stalin came to power in the absence of a'broad consensus on the 
legitimacy and necessity of his personal rule. Indeed the ruling party did 
not yet enjoy a firm ideological or cultural hegemony among the population, 
and repression and even mass terror had been-periodically used, as in the 
Civil War and the collectivization of agriculture, to enforce the power of the ' 
state and remove-potential sources of opposition. -Yet at the same time the 
regime confidently conceived of itself as possessing a popular and 
historically-sanctioned mandate and worked assiduously to create real 
support for itself -- through education and propaganda, leadership cults, 
election campaigns, broad national discussions (e.g., -on the constitution), 
public celebrations (like the Pushkin centennial of '1937), show trials, and 
political rituals. Most importantly, the regime made real concessions to the 
populace and satisfied the ambitions and aspirations of many (certainly not 
all) for social mobility and an improved living standard. Peasants who 
became workers and workers who became managers and party bosses were 
moving up, while many of their envied social "betters" of the past were 
experiencing an enforced downward mobility. 
By ending NEP and almost all private production and trade, Stalin 
created the first modern non-market, state-run economy, one that 
simultaneously eliminated rival sources of power and resistance to the will 
of the central authorities. "Industrialists" no longer held property in the 
means of production. Workers could not longer effectively organize in order 
to raise the price of labor. Farmers could no longer withhold grain to effect 
market prices. Yet all of these groups devised ways within the command 
economy to exercise limited degrees of power, autonomy, and resistance. 
Much of Soviet history has been about raising output-and productivity, and . 
successive state strategies required accommodations and concessions as often 
as additional pressure and repression.5 Thus, while power was actively 
being concentrated a t  the top by Stalin, it was being diffused downward and 
outward throughout the economic and political systems by thousands of 
yintiki (little screws) who had their own requirements for survival and 
"making out." The state grew; in Lewin's sense, it "swallowed" society; but 
at the same time it was unable to realize the visionpresented by 
totalitarian theory of complete atomization of society. 'The limits of state 
power were met when people refused to work efficiently, or migrated from 
place to place, or informally worked out ways to resist pressure from above. 
Stalinism was a t  one and the same time a revolution-izing system, 
unwilling to accept backward Russia as i t  was (and here it differs from 
5. Much of the work of Lewis Siegelbaum has explored the various 
strategies by which the regime attempted to raise productivity. See, for 
example, his "Soviet Norm Determination in Theory and Practice, 1917- 
1941," Soviet Stub, XXXVI, (1984), pp. 48-67. 
many traditionally authoritarian dictatorships), and a restorative one, 
anxious to re-establish hierarchies, certain traditional values like patriotism 
and patriarchy, and political legitimacy based on more than victorious 
revolution. The ideological props of the Stalin dictatorship were both a 
seriously-revised Marxism and a pro-Russian nationalism and etatism. 
Class warfare was seen as inevitable and increasing rather than diminishing 
as the country approached socialism. The country was surrounded by 
hostile capitalist states that made the increase of state power necessary. 
When the Soviet Union was declared to be socialist by Stalin in '1936, the 
positive achievement of reaching a stage of history higher than the rest of 
the world was tempered by the constant reminders that the enemies of 
socialism exist both within and outside the country, that they are deceptive 
and concealed, and must be "unmasked." Repeated references to dangers 
and insecurity justified the enormous reliance on the "steel gauntlets of 
Ezhov. " 
The paradox of the October Revolution had been that the Bolsheviks 
possessed the ,physical power to overthrow the Provisional-Government and 
disband the Constituent Assembly but had neither a popular mandate to 
rule all of Russia (let alone the non-Russian peripheries) nor an unassailable 
legitimizing myth to sanction their claim to govern. Even as they 
successfully built a new state during the years of Civil War, the Bolsheviks 
were (as Lenin usually admitted), and remained until a t  least the Second 
World War, a minority party that needed to justify its hold on power. As 
George Breslauer has written about a later period in Soviet history, 
"Authority is legitimized power," and Soviet leaders had to legitimize their 
power and policies by demonstrating their competence or indispensability as 
ru1ersi6 One of the central dilemmas of the Communists in the first two 
decades of their rule was to move from an.exercise of power through force 
toward creating a base of support through the construction of a widely- 
accepted, - hegemonic understanding of the historical moment. Whatever 
benefits a practice of state terror might bring a regime in the short term, 
"authority-building is necessary to protect and expand one's base of political 
support."7 Yet a t  the same time as they attempted to construct a 
legitimizing cultural and political hegemony, the Communists steadily 
narrowed the political field. One of the most "democratic" (in the sense of 
grassroots popular .participation) polities in the world (that of the 
revolutionary years 19 17-1918) rapidly turned step-by-step into a 
dictatorship. First the establishment of Soviet power and the dissolution of 
zemstva, dumas, and the Constituent Assembly eliminated the upper and 
middle classes, as well as the clergy, from the m. Then when in the 
months before the Civil War began the coalition partners of the Bolsheviks, 
the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, resigned from the Sovnarkom, a one-party 
government was created. During the Civil War the vitality and autonomy 
of local soviets declined, as the working class of 1917 itself fragmented and 
dissolved. Central ,government agents, Red Army units, the police and the 
party .gained influence. Manipulation of elections, coercive practices, 
indifference and apathy, all in the context of vicious' fratricidal warfare 
steadily weakened the power and legitimacy of the soviets and eroded the 
rival political parties. At the same time state, party, and military 
institutions were constructed that effectively created a new state power 
under the control of the'communists. By 1922 interparty politics were an 
6. George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and-B~zhnev as Leaders: Bu . . . . ildirbg 
Authoritv m Soviet Politics (London: George Allen Unwin, 1982), p. 4. 
7. Ibid., p. 10. 
historical memory, and the only arena for political discussion and infighting 
was within the Communist party. The ban on factions in 1921, the 
progressive elimination of political oppositions through the 1920s, and the 
steady accumulation of power by a single faction reduced the political arena 
even further, until a handful of influential figures decided the course for the 
rest of the party. Within the party political manipulation, Machiavellian 
intrigues, and a willingness to resort to ruthlessness were certainly part of 
Stalin's repetoire, but he also managed to position himself in the.post-Lenin 
years as a pragmatic centrist supportive of the compromises and concessions 
of the New Economic Policy and unwilling to risk Soviet power in efforts to 
promote elusive revolutions abroad. 
In his prerevolutionary career Stalin had been the komitetchik 
(committee man) extraordinarily, a skillful political infighter able to gather 
about him loyal comrades with whom he could then take on Menshevik or 
dissident Bolshevik opponents. Whatever his personal predilections for 
unchallenged power, his inability to accept frustration or criticism, and his 
visceral suspiciousness directed even a t  those close to him, Stalin was also 
the product of the particular political culture and internal party practices of 
Bolshevism. Truth was singular, objective, knowable to those trained in 
Marxism-Leninism. Force and repression were available to be used in the 
service of socialism, which was defined in Stalin's mind as identical to his 
own policies and preservation of his personal position. ^Once he had reached 
his exalted position as chief oligarch, he spoke in the name of the party and 
the Central Committee without consulting anyone else. And he molded his 
own version of Leninism as an effective weapon against pretenders. 
The ultimate "man of the machine," Stalin was one of the least likely 
candidates for charismatic hero. Short in stature, reticent in meetings and 
on public occasions, neither a talented orator like Hitler or Trotsky, nor an 
attractive and engaging personality, like Lenin or Bukharin, Stalin did not 
himself project an image of a leader -- until it was created for him (and by 
him) through the cult. First the promotion of a cult of Lenin, which S t a h  
actively encouraged, then his identification as a loyal Leninist, and 
eventually his merger with and substitution for the image of Lenin were 
important props for Stalin's authority both within the party and in society.S 
All this was accomplished in a political culture based on the 
,prerevolutionary Bolshevik traditions in which emphasis on personality, the 
exaggerated importance of the leader, and the attendant sacral notions of 
infallibility were all alien. 
Overall his policies were aimed a t  monopolization of.decision-making 
at the highest possible levels. Yet centralization and the reduction of local 
power, in fact, often had the opposite effect, fostering local centers of power, 
family circles, atamanshchina, and low-level disorganization. '"Little 
Stalins" were created throughout the country, and in the national republics 
ethn~political machines threatened the reach of the central .government.g 
Early in the 1930s he pushed hard for the end of any duality'between party 
and state, urging Molotov in a series of private letters .to end'prirne 
Minister Rykov's tenure and take the job himself.1° 
The top (verkhushkd of our central soviet 
[apparatus] (ST0 [Council of Labor an&'Defense],' SNK 
[Council of People's Commissars], the conference of 
deputy commissars) is sick with a fatal disease. ST0 has 
turned from a business-like and fighting organ into an 
empty parliament. SNK is paralyzed by the wishy- 
8. Robert C. Tucker, "The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult," American 
H i s t o ~ a l  Review, LXXXIV, 2 (April 1979), pp. 347-366. 
9. Merle Fainsod, Smolensk 1 J&r Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1958), pp. 48-61; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making.dlhe 
Georgian Nation (Bloomington and Stanford: Indiana University Press and 
Hoover Institution Press, 1988), pp. 260-291. 
10. "Pis'ma Stalina Molotovu," Kommunist, no. 11 (1990), pp. '102-105. 
washy and, essentially, anti-party speeches of Rykov. 
The conference of deputy commissars, which was earlier 
the staff of Rykov, As, and Sheiman, now has the 
tendency to turn into the staff of Rykov, Piatakov, 
Kviring or Bogolepov (I see no great difference between 
the latter .and-the former), .setting. itself' up .against. the 
Central Committee of the party. It is clear that this can 
continue no-further . .Fundamental measures -are -needed. 
I will discuss what kind when I return to Moscow. 
A week later he urged the dismissal of Rykov and Shmidt and the 
dissolution of "their entire bureaucratic consultative, secretarial apparatus.'" 
By securing the premiership for Molotov, one of the few he seems to have 
trusted through the 1930s, Stalin sought to prevent any razrvv (schism) 
between party and state, to end discussion in the Sovnarkom that delayed 
the carrying out of his policies, and to concentrate all decision-making 
within a-loyal Politburo. "With this combination we -will have full unity of 
the soviet and party summits (verkhuski) that will undoubtedly double our 
strength. " l l 
'The naked exercise of unrestrained power was'key to Stalin's victory. 
Yet simultaneously his regime worked to create authority and -legitimacy, 
borrowing from and supplementing the repetoire of justifications from 
Lenin's day. In the post-October scramble to hold on to the reins-of 
.government, Lenin and the Bolsheviks.justified their actions by reference to 
a variety of historic claims -- that they represented the vanguard of the 
proletariat organized in the soviets; that they were the only party able to 
bring peace and order to the country and willing to give the land to the 
peasants; that the transition to socialism was a t  hand and the weakest link 
in the capitalist chain had been broken. Russia's second revolution would 
receive its ultimate sanction in the rising of the European working class, 
and all talk of the prematurity of the Bolshevik seizure of power would 
11. Ibid., p. 105. 
cease. The Civil War provided a new justification for holding power -- the 
fight against enemies domestic and foreign, the preservation of the victories 
of 1917 and the prevention of a restoration. As unpopular as the 
Communists were in many parts of the country, they were accepted as the 
lesser of evils, and acquiescence to, if not positive acceptance of, Lenin's 
government spread through different social strata and groups -- workers, 
many peasants, intellectuals, certain nationalities like the Jews, who were 
particular victims of White anti-Semitism. "As long as the peasants feared 
the whites, they would go along, feet dragging, with the demands of the 
Soviet regime .... Thus the Bolshevik dictatorship climbed up on the back of 
the peasant revolution. "12 Without a proletarian victory in the West 
(without which, according to Lenin, socialism was impossible in Russia), 
millenarian rhetoric was supplemented with a hardnosed reliance on force, 
terror, armed might, organization and new kinds of propaganda. 
The development of a cult around Lenin and the formulation of a 
relatively coherent doctrine called Leninism were part of a more general 
effort to take over the ideological space formerly occupied by religion. Both 
Nina Tumarkin and Richard Stites have shown how new symbols and 
rituals were insinuated into the new cultural sphere opened by the 
iconoclastic practices of the early Bolsheviks. Red flags replaced tricolors; 
statues of Marx and Engels were hastily erected in place of tsars and 
generals; and images of America and modern life were used to inspire a 
faith in a future to which the Bolsheviks would lead the Soviet union.13 At 
pp 
12. Orlando Figes, Peasant. C . . ivil War: The Volea Countrvside ~n 
v o l u ~ .  191 7- 1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 354. 
13. NinaTumarkin, J ' I 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Abbott Gleason, Peter 
Kenez, and Richard Stites, editors, Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and 
Order in the Russian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
'1985); Richard Stites, Revolu_tionarv Dreams: Utopian Vision and 
best, the creation of a new Soviet culture and popular acceptance of the 
political and economic projects of the Communists was a partial success, 
largely confined to the cities, to  the elites and to significant numbers of 
urban workers. Though the relative peace, stability, and economic 
improvement of the NEP years, in contrast to the preceding seven years of 
war, revolution, and civil war, gave the Leninist state a degree of 
acceptance, even legitimacy, in the eyes of many, that acceptance was 
fragile and based on the compromises and limits of what the Communists 
almost invariably saw as a transitional period, a temporary retreat from 
socialism. 
In the Stalinist formulation the "revolution from above" of the 1930s, 
though initiated by the state, was supported from below by millions of 
peasants and workers struggling to create a new society based on collective 
farms and socialist industry. But in fact the launching of the Stalin 
revolution, first in the countryside and then in inkstry,  destroyed the basis 
of the regime's relationship with the.great majority of the population (the 
smvchka) and created a new crisis of legitimacy and authority. The 
enormous dificulties that the breakthrough into "socialism" entailed -- 
resistance from farmers, famine, economic bottlenecks and breakdowns -- 
were seen as the work of enemies and saboteurs, rather than inherent in the 
.party's policies .or a'by-product of popular recalcitrance and massive 
coercion. The disjuncture between these forced images of imagined harmony 
and purpose and the chasm that divided the. partylstate from large parts of 
the population created unease among many as they attempted to govern a 
vast country and transform it according to a vision that only a minority 
within a minority shared. 
Experimental Life in the R h n  Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University ' 
Press, 198 ); 
The open resistance to collectivization among the peasants was 
reflected in less drastic form by quiet forms of opposition within the party. 
The oligarchy that carried out the Stalin revolution was a very narrow 
political elite but not one that had effectively closed the party to debate and 
consideration of alternatives. Between the fall of Bukharin in 1928- 1929 
and the death of Kirov in December 1934, Stalin-faction rule, produced and 
reproduced oppositions and potential oppositions. The real disagreements 
with the General Line of rapid industrialization and full collectivizatioi and 
depolarization were fueled by the evident failures and costs of implementing 
these policies. In his own statements Stalin refused to accept any blame for 
the economic chaos or the famine. They were the work of saboteurs, "'the 
last remnants of moribund classes," some of whomhad '"even managed to 
worm their way into the party." More repression was needed, for "the 
abolition of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the class struggle, 
but its intensification.. . . We must bear in mind that the growth of the .power 
of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the last remnants of the 
dying classes."14 In a letter replying to the Cossack writer -Mikhail 
Sholokhov's protests against the systematic brutality of the grain collection, 
Stalin took a hard line: 
One must take into account.. .the other side. And 
that other side amounts to the fact that the respected . 
corn-growers of your region (and not only your region) 
have gone on a sit-down strike (sabotage!) and shown no 
concern about leaving the workers, the Red Army, 
without grain. The fact that the sabotage was peaceful 
and outwardly bloodless in no way alters the realities -- 
that the respected grain-growers have in essence carried 
out a 'peaceful' war with Soviet power. A war by 
starvation w a  na imor], dear Comrade 
Sholokhov. " 
14. I. V. Stalin, "Itogi pervoi piatiletki: Doklad 7 ianvaria 1933 g.," 
Sochineniia, XII, pp. 21 1-212. 
15. Quoted by Khrushchev, March 8, 1963; Fravda, March 10, 1963; 
Jonathan Haslam, "Political Opposition to Stalin and the origins of the 
The growing gap between the public statements and images put forth 
by the state, on the one hand, and the real destruction in the countryside 
and the "Potemkin village" factories produced prominent ,party members 
unwilling to participate in the cover-up of the failures. Already in late 1930 
some in the leadership of the RSFSR and the Transcaucasian federation 
expressed misgivings, which in turn were interpreted by the Stalin center as 
a widespread and united oppositional tendency (the Syrtsov-Lominadze 
Right-Left ~ l o c ) . l ~  Swift retribution (demotion in these cases) did not deter 
a number of other critical foci to emerge, notably the Riutin platform (1930) 
and-Appeal (1932) and the Smirnov, Tolmachev, and Eismont opposition 
(1932). Within the Central Committee and the Politburo more moderate 
elements opposed the rapid tempos in industry and proposed a more 
conciliatory attitude toward society, particularly the peasantry. 
Riutin's appeal of 1932 is symptomatic of the views of those opposed 
to Stalin's emerging dictatorship, who saw it as the. negation of'Leninism 
and the collective leadership of the Central Committee, and the principal 
cause of the growing disillusionment of the people with socialism.'Those 
Terror in Russia, 1932-1936," The Historical Journal, XXIX, 2 (1986), p. 
403. 
16. R. W. Davies, "The Syrtsov-Lominadze Affair, SovietvStudies, XXXIII, 1 
(January 1981)' pp. 29-50. Indicative ofathe mood in-the party is a 
conversation with Lominadze reported by a friend: "When I saw him, with 
-another-of.his friends, in 1931, he was boldly critical of Stalin's-leadership. 
Now that opposition from both Left and Right had been suppressed, he 
thought the next logical step was a radical reform of the Party and its 
personnel. 
'What about the General Secretary?' asked his friend. 'If there is.a 
spring cleaning, every piece of furniture has to be removed, including the 
biggest one .' 'But who could replace him?' 
'That's up to the Congress.' It was time for younger men to take a 
share of the responsibility -- men who had some practical experience but 
had been less involved in the struggle between the factions. 
Needless to say, this was extremely risky talk. It even occurred to 
me that Lominadze saw himself as a suitable successor to Stalin." [Joseph 
f a Generhon: TheaMemoirs of Joseph Berg= Berger, Shipwreck o (London: 
Harvill Press, 1971); American edition: Nothing But the Trul& (New York: 
John Day, 1971)], p. 1661 
around Riutin, who formed a Union of Marxist-Leninists, believed that the 
only way to save Bolshevism was to remove Stalin and his clique by force. 
If Riutin was right that "the faith of the masses in socialism has been 
broken, its readiness to defend selflessly the proletarian revolution from all 
enemies weakens each year," then the regime .had either to move 
immediately toward conciliation and the rebuilding of confidence or turn to 
17 even more radical and repressive measures. 
Riutin's circle is an unusual instance of coherence and organization 
among those who opposed ~talin.-l8 Much more evident was a broad, 
inchoate discontent with Stalin's rule that permeated political and 
intellectual circles. Several loyal Stalinists, like Kaminskii, Kosior, 
Vareikis, and Bauman, harbored serious doubts about Stalin's agricultural 
policies. Others, like Mykola Skrypnyk, a co-founder of the Ukrainian 
Communist Party who had sided with Stalin in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
were critical of the growing centrism in the party and state and the evident 
pro-Russianness of Stalin's nationality-policies. l9 Perhaps most ominously, 
tensions arose between the Red Army commander, 'Mikhail Tukhachevskii, 
who called in 1930 for expansion of the armed forces, particularly aviation 
17. M. .Rutin, "KO vsem chenam VKP(b);" reprinted in Kh. Kobo (editor), 
Osmvslit kult Stal - 9  ina (Moscow: Progress, 1989), pp. 618-623. 
18. Riutin and seventeen associates were expelled from the partyx by the 
Central Control Commission on October 9, 1932, for'"having attempted to 
set up a bourgeois, kulak organization to re-establish capitalism and, in 
particular, the kulak system in the USSR by means of underground activity 
under the fraudulent banner of 'Marxism-Leninism'." A number of accounts 
hold that Stalin demanded the death penalty for Riutin but was thwarted 
by Kirov -and other moderates. [Boris I. Nicolaevsky, P 
Elite: "The Letter of an Old Bolshevik and Other E m  I t  (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 3-65; Arkadii Vaksberg, "Kak zhivoi s 
zhivymi, " -, June 29, 1988; Lev Razgon, "Nakonets!" 
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*. i, June 26, 1988; Dmitrii Volkogonov, Trx . . . . ohticheskli portret I. V. S ta l iw I, part 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1989), pp. 
85-86] 
19. Skrypnyk committed suicide in 1933, as Ukrainian national communists 
were systematically being purged. 
and tank armies, and Stalin and Voroshilov, who opposed what they called 
"Red militarism."2o During the famine in Ukraine high military officers, 
like Iakir, angered Stalin by reporting their upset a t  peasant resistance, 
which, they felt, could spread to the troops. and demanding that more grain 
be kept in the region.21 
Even among Stalin's closest supporters there were fractures, though 
their precise nature remains mysterious. -Many surmise that moderate 
forces coalesced around Sergei Kirov and Sergo Orjonikidze, who opposed 
using the death penalty against Riutin. 'The open disagreement a t  the 
Seventeenth 'Party Congress (January - February 1934) between 
Orjonikidze and Molotov over industrial targets was a rare public sign of a 
deeper split between moderates and radicals.22 The popular Kirov, the 
only real rival left to Stalin by 1932, was in all his public and political 
appearances completely loyal to the General Secretary, though he often 
emphasized the need for "revolutionary legality," which was understood to 
be a lessening of repressive measures:23 Stalin still represented-for the 
majority.of party members the militant turn toward socialism -- 
collectivization, rapid industrialization, the destruction of organized political 
opposition. However, his personal proclivity toward the use of force seemed 
to some to have-gone beyond the broad bounds of Bolshevik practice. 
20. R. W. Davies, The Ilndurialisation of Soviet Russia, 3: The Soviet 
Economv in Turmoil. 1929-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), ,pp. 446-447. 'In May 1932 Stalin apologized to Tukhachevskii 
and endorsed some of his proposed reforms. 
21. Eventually some grain was sent to Ukraine in January 1933 along with 
the new party boss, Postyshev. 
22. Kendall E. Bailes, Technologv 
Qrigins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 19 17-194 1 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978), pp:275-280; Getty, Qriens o . . f the G r e a  
Purges, pp. 13-17. 
23. S. Kirov, Wi i rechi, 1934 (Moscow, 1934). 
Neither a consistent moderate nor radical, Stalin himself shifted 'from 
center-right (during his alliance with Bukharin in the mid-1920s) to left 
(during the so-called "cultural revolution") and then back to a more 
moderate position around 1931-1932. Responding to a growing mood among 
.party leaders concerned with industry, Stalin announced in June 1931 a 
major change in the party's wage ,policy (the end of u-, leveling of 
wages, and the introduction of greater differentials between skilled and 
unskilled workers in order to end labor migration) and a much more tolerant 
and supportive policy toward the technical intelligentsia.24 Whether or not 
this policy shift was imposed on Stalin or corresponded to agenuine re- 
evaluation of his position, during'the next half decade'he steadily'began to 
reverse the more radical policies of the 1920s and the early 1930s and pull 
back from egalitarianism and collectivism toward a promotion of hierarchy, 
cultural traditionalism, and social conservatism that has come to be known 
as the "Great Retreat." 
On a variety of fronts the-Stalinists retreated from their forward 
positions of just a few.years earlier. Though the collective farms remained 
firmly under the tutelage of the state and continued to operate essentially 
as grain-collection apparatuses;25 a series of decisions allowed the collective- 
farm peasants to possess some livestock, to sell their surpluses on the 
24. I. V. Stalin, "Novaia obstanovka -- novye zadachi~lihoziaistvennogo 
stroitel'stve," Sochineniia, XI11 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1951), pp. 51-80. Bailes shows how this conciliatory 
move was initiated by Orjonikidze and others involved in industrial 
production [a'echnology and Society, pp. 144- 1553. 
25. Moshe Lewin, "'Taking Grain": Soviet Policies of Agricultural 
Procurements Before the War," The Making of the Soviet Svstem: E s s w  
1 History of Interwar Russia (New York: Pantheon, 19851, pp. 
142-177. "Peasants in Stalin's times were indeed legally bound to their 
place of work, submitted to a special legal regimen, and -- through the 
kolkhoz -- to a form of collective responsibility with regard to state duties. 
They were transformed, not unlike as in pre-emancipation times, into an 
estate placed at the very bottom of the social ladder." (p. 176) 
18 
market, and to own their houses and work household plots. While workers 
were increasingly restricted in their movements through the 1930s, an 
essentially "bourgeois" system of remuneration was created: "from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his work." Workers were 
encouraged to compete with one another in order, not only to maximize 
output, but to win material rewards, and various collective forms of 
organizing work and payment were eliminated.26 Progressive piece work 
was introduced in the spring of 1934, and while real wages fell for most 
workers a significant number of udarniki (shock workers) and &akhanovtsv 
participated in the more l'joyous" life that Stalin had promised.27 Worker 
power declined and that of managers and technicians increased.28 "The 
Party wanted the bosses to be efficient, powerful, harsh, impetuous, and 
capable of exerting pressure crudely and ruthlessly and getting results 
'whatever the cost'. ... The formation of the despotic manager was actually a 
process in which not leaders but rulers were made."29 In the words of 
Moishe Kaganovich, "The ground must shake when the factory director 
enters the plant." 
The severe economic crisis of the winter of 1932-1933, as well as the 
coming to power of Hitler in Germany, helped accelerate the swing toward 
state policies that favored the educated and ambitious and eased the 
pressure on others. By the middle of the year arrests and deportations 
26. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, "Production Collectives and Communes and the 
'Imperatives' of Soviet Industrialization, 1929-193 1," Slavic Review, XLV, 1 
(Spring 1986), pp. 65-84. 
hanovism a 27. Lewis 'H. Siegelbaum, Stak nd the Politics.of Productivitv in 
e USSR, 1935-1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881, 
particularly chapter 6, "Stakhanovites in the Cultural Mythology of the 
1930s." . ,  28. Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin s I n b t r i a l  Revolution: Politics and  worker^ 
1928-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 50-77. 
29. Moshe Lewin, "Society, State, and Ideology during the First Five-Year 
Plan,". in Sheila Fitzpatrick (editor), Culbral Revolution in R-. 1928- 
193 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 74. 
declined, and production targets for the Second Five-Year Plan were reduced 
and consumer goods given higher priority. In his public rhetoric of these 
years Stalin maintained his severity and toughness, qualities that had long 
been part of Bolshevik culture, but showed that under -pressure he could be 
more flexible and accommodating. He seemed, not only a competent 
commander to many but indeed an indispensable leader in a time of political 
stress and economic crisis. A high party official, Barmin, wrote about this 
period (1932): "Loyalty to Stalin was based principally on the conviction 
that there was no one to take his place, that any change of leadership would 
be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue in its present 
course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of 
everything. "30 -Rumors that Stalin had suggested that he resign (probably 
after the suicide of his second wife, Nadezhda Allilueva, in November 1932) 
were embellished by reports of his associates rallying around him. 
The private letters from the vacationingSStalin to his closest comrade 
Molotov (from 1930 and 1933) reveal in a striking way the less public 
characteristics ofthe dictator and his methods of rule. .He wrote short, terse 
memoranda to Molotov on the important matters that were before the 
Politburo, and apparently did the same with Kaganovich, 0 rjonikidze, and 
others. "From the boss (khoziain) we are receiving regular and frequent 
directives, " Kaganovich wrote '0 rjoriikidze in 1932: "31 While he. preferred 
to work through his own narrow circle of friends -- 'Molotov, who was his 
principal executor,32 Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Orjonikidze, Kaganovich -- 
30. A. Barmine, One Who'Survived (New York: 1945), p. 
31. "Pis'ma Stalina Molotovu," p. 94. 
32. "Molotov was the only member of the'politburo whom Stalin addressed 
with the familiar pronoun &y..  . Molotov, though impotent without Stalin's 
leadership, was indispensable to Stalin in many ways. Though both were 
unscrupulous in their methods, it seems to me that Stalin selected these 
methods carefully and fitted them to circumstances, while Molotov regarded 
them in advance as being incidental and unimportant. I maintain that he 
Stalin was quick to turn on any of them if he felt challenged. In 1933 he 
severely criticized Orjonikidze for objecting to remarks by Vyshinskii that 
attacked those working in the industrial and agricultural ministries: "The 
behavior of Sergo (and Iakovlev) in the story of the "completeness of 
production" is impossible to call anything else but anti-party, because it has 
as its objective goal the defense of reactionary elements of the party wainst 
the CC V K P ( ~ ) : " ~ ~  Because Kaganovich had sided with Orjonikidze, he too 
fell under Stalin's wrath. Nothing came of this dispute at the time, nor of 
the more serious accusations made against Mikhail Kalinin. 
The OGPU was carrying out investigations in 1930 into a series of 
anti-Soviet "parties" made up of former Mensheviks, industrial specialists, 
and Ukrainian activists:34 Stalin received regular reports from Iagoda and 
insisted that Molotov circulite them among the members of the Central 
Committee and the Central Control Commission, as well as among "the 
. . 
more active of our xoziaistvenniki (economic specialists)." He told Molotov 
that he was convinced that these conspiratorial elements were linked with 
the Rightists within the party. "It is absolutely essential to shoot 
.Kondrat'ev, Groman and a pair of the other bastards (merzavts v).... I t  is 
absolutely essential to shoot the whole group of wreckers in meat production 
and to,publish this information in the press.''35 He personally demanded 
the arrests of the former Menshevik Sukhanov, his'communist wife (who 
must have known what was going on in their home), 'Bazarov, Ramzin, and 
others. The concocted stories of anti-Soviet conspiracies were fed 
not only incited Stalin into doing many things, but that he also sustained 
him and dispelled his doubts ... it would be wrong to underestimate Molotov's 
role, especially as the practical executive. " [Milovan Djilas, Conversations 
with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, I962), pp. 62, 70-711 
33. Ibid. 
34. Ibid., pp. 103. 
35. Ibid., p. 103. 
throughout the top bureaucracy and created an atmosphere of suspicion that 
justified the use of precisely the kinds of harsh measures that Stalin 
advocated. 
Fear and the need for vigilance, which were created both by the police 
findings and the real weaknesses and insecurities of the Soviet Union, bound 
the beleaguered Communists together around the leader who projected an 
image of Bolshevik toughness. At'the same time the Stalinist settlement 
involved the creation of a highly hierarchical system of rewards and 
privileges, of access to information and influence, that effectively 
disenfranchised the great mass of the population and privileged a small 
number of party and state officials, intellectuals, and managers. The end of 
rationing in 1934-1935 forced everyone below the privileged upper levels of 
society to forage in government stores and peasant markets for what they 
could afford. Social inequalities grew in an economy of permanent shortages 
where money talked less effectively than one's position and personal 
connections. A "ruling class without tenure," in Lewin's phrase;36 grew 
increasingly dependent on being in favor with those even higher up. They 
were under a constant threat of demotion, expulsion from the party, arrest 
and even death. Their success required. absolute and unquestioning 
obedience, enforcement of the decisions from the top with determination, 
even ruthlessness, on those below, and a willingness to acquiesce and 
participate in what can only be considered criminal activity (denunciations 
of the innocent, approval of lawlessness, collaboration with a regime based 
on deception).37 Their dilemma was that i t  was dangerous for them to be 
36. Moshe Lewin, "The Social Background of Stalinism," in Robert C. 
Tucker (editor), Stahism: Essavs in Historical Interpretat n . . io (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 130. 
37. Roi Medvedev, Oni okruzhali Sta 
- 9  
lina (Moscow, 1990); English 
translation: All Stalin s Men (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1984). 
anything but responsive to the top, and yet their position and requirements 
to increase production and satisfy the demands of the top and the center 
.pulled them toward making arrangements with the bottom and the 
periphery. 
The years of upheaval and uncertainty of the early 1930s were 
clearly coming to an end by the opening of the Seventeenth Party Congress 
in late January 1934. Though the full story has yet to'be told, there 
appears to have been a movement a t  the Congress to replace Stalin with 
Kirov, but 'Kirov's -differences -with Stalin .were .not great enough for 'the 
Leningrad leader t o  repudiate the General Secretary .as many others 
wished. Though many still feared -the .trend toward.,personal autocracy by, 
Stalin, the oligarchic bureaucratic system seemed more secure than ever; 
oppositions had been rendered impotent; and a new emphasis on 
"revolutionary legality" seemed to, promise a more orderly, procedural, less 
disruptive mode of governance. 'But, as :Lewin notes: 
Stalin was not ready to accept the role of just a 
cog, however~powerful, 'in.his own machine. A top 
bureaucrat is a+chief executive, in the framework of a 
constraining.committee.. . . 'But Stalin had had the. power, 
and the taste for it -- efor ever more of it -- since he had 
led the early stage of the shattering breakthrough and 
gotten full control over the state in the process. At this 
point, the traits-of his gloomy personality, witheclear 
paranoid tendencies become crucial. Once a t  the top and 
in full control, he was not a man to accept changes in the 
pattern of -his personal -power.. . . He therefore took the 
road of shaking up,-of destabilizing the machinery and its 
upper layers, in order to block the process fatally 
working a nst his personal predilection for d autocracy. 
The period before the murder of Kirov (December 1934) might be 
seen as the prehistory of Stalinism, the period of formation of the political 
structures and social conditions that created the possibility for a regime of 
38. 'Lewin, "The Social Background of Stalinism," .pp. 130- 13 1. 
extreme centralization of power, overwhelming dominance of a weakened 
society, and particular ferocity. The unlimited despotism of Stalinism was 
the product of the Great Purges, which simultaneously eliminated all 
possible resistance and created a new and more loyal elite with which the 
tyrant could rule. Several different interpretations have been offered by 
analysts as to the causes and effects of the Purges. For some, like Zbigniew 
Brzezinski who proposed that purging was a permanent and necessary 
component of totalitarianism in 'lieu of elections, or Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 
who sees the purges as simply the most extreme manifestation of the 
amorality of the Marxist vision, the Ezhovshchina was an inherent and 
inevitable-part of the Soviet system. Others have explained the Purges as a 
more extreme form of political infighting. '"The existence of high-level 
personal rivalries, disputes over development or modernization plans, 
powerful and conflicting centrifugal and centripetal forces, and local 
conflicts," writes J. Arch Getty, '"made .large-scale political violence, possible 
and even likely.'"39 .Dissatisfaction with Stalin's rule and with the harsh 
material conditions was palpable in the mid-1930s, and, writes Gabor T. 
'Rittersporn, . "In all -probability, the struggles of 1936- 1937 were unleashed 
by popular discontent with the arbitrariness, corruption and inefficiency of 
the ruling strata. 1140 "The purge was not a punitive enterprise inflicted 
victoriously from above, but primari1y.a.n intense internal struggle within 
the state apparatus resulting from the need to ensure the functioning of the 
uncontrollable administrative, economic and. political machinery. '14 l The 
vastness of the bloodletting crushed for a time the family circles and local 
. . 
39. Getty, s of the Great Pur p. 206. 
40. Gabor T u A g a i n s t  Itself: Socialist Tensions and 
Political Conflict in the U.S.S.R., 1936-1938," Telos, no. 41 (Fall 1979), p. 
87. 
41. Gabor T. Rittersporn, "Stalin in 1938: Political Defeat Behind the 
Rhetorical Apotheosis," w, no. 46 (Winter 1980-81), p. 6. 
feudatories (particularly in the union republics), but by 1938 the mass 
arrests and executions brought in their wake, not only concentration of 
power a t  the top and center, but even greater disorder and insecurity. 
"Nothing seems to warrant the traditional image of Soviet politics in the 
1930s with its omnipotent dictator and his totally controlled instruments of 
unlimited power. Everything points to the assumption that, far from being 
an autocrat's successful offensive against a whole society, the central 
political phenomenon of the decade resembled much more a kind of feudal 
anarchy or institutionalized civil war. 14-2 
Several writers have focused on the effects of the Purges rather than 
its causes, though it is implied that intentions may be read into the results. 
A. L. Unger, Kendall E. Bailes, and Sheila Fitzpatrick have shown how a 
new "leading stratum" of Soviet-educated "specialists" replaced the Old 
Bolsheviks and "bourgeois specialists."43 'The largest number were 
promoted workers and party rank-and-file, .young technicians, who would 
make up the Soviet elite through the post-Stalin period until the early 
1 9 8 0 s . ~ ~ * " ~ t a l i n  -- a d, for that matter, the majority of Soviet citizens --," 
. . 
42. Gabor T. Rittersporn, "Rethinking Stalinism," b i a n  Historv/H~toire 
Russe, XI, 4 (Winter ;1984), .pp. T3571358. =Whereas Getty and Sheila 
Fitzpatrick see Stalin as moving between or "standing above" the moderate 
and radical camps-in the higher-circles of-the -party, Rittersporn believes 
that Stalin was always in the radical camp and suffered a kind of defeat in 
1938. Sheila Fitzpatrick, for=example, writes: "Soviet politics of the 1930s 
should be viewed as .a conflict between policemen (those like Molotov whose 
primary concern-was internal security and control) and industrializers (the 
Ordzhonikidze type), with Stalin normally standing above the conflict but 
combining characteristics of *both groups." ["Stalin and the Making of a 
New Elite, 1928-1939," Slavic Review, XXXVIII, 3 (September 1979), p. 
402.1 
43. A. L. Unger, "Stalin's Renewal of the Leading Stratum: A Note on the 
Great Purge," Soviet Studies, XX, 3 (January 1969), pp. 321-330; Kendall 
E. Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin, pp. 268-27 1, 412- 
413; Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Stalin and the Making of a New Elite, 1928-1939," 
Slavic Review, XXXVIII, 3 (September 1979), pp. 3 77-402. 
44. Bailes criticizes Fitzpatrick for not distinguishing between those who 
rose into the intelligentsia through formal education, many of whom were 
workers (the vvdviz-, and: the .p&tk, who were elevated through 
writes Sheila Fitzpatrick, "saw the cadres of the mid 1930s less in their old 
role as revolutionaries than in the current role as bosses. There is even 
some evidence that Stalin saw them as Soviet boyars (feudal lords) and 
himself' as a latter-day Ivan the Terrible, who had to destroy the boyars to 
-1145 build a modern nation state and a new service nobility. 
More traditionally, the Great Purges have been seen as an effort "to 
achieve an unrestricted .personal-dictatorship with a totality of*power that 
[Stalin] did not.yet possess in 1934." 46 Initiation of the Purges came from 
'Stalin, who guided and .prodded the arrests, show trials, and executions 
forward, aided by the closest.members of-his entourage: Molotov, 
Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and, of course, 'Ezhov. Here 
personality and politics merge, and the degree of .excess repression is 
dictated by the peculiar demands of Stalin himself, who could not tolerate 
limits on his will set by the very ruling elite that he had-brought to power. 
"It is one of the mysteries of Stalinism," Lewin summarizes, 
.that itturned-muchrof the ?fury of its bloody 
purges against this very real.mainstay,of the regime. 
There were among -the apparaty, probably, -still too many 
former members of other parties or of the original 
Leninist -party, .too many -participants -and victors *of the 
civil war who remembered who had done what during 
those days of glory. Too many thus could feel the right 
to be considered founders of the regime and base on it 
part-of the claims to a say in decisions.and to security in 
their positions. Probably, also letting the new and 
sprawling administration settle .and get encrusted in 
.,their -work experience. '.["Stalin and the :Making of a'New 'Elite: A 
Comment," Slavic Review, XXXIX, 2 (June .l980), pp. 286-289.1 
45.'Sheila .Fitzpatrick, The Russian 'Revolution (1984), :p. '159. Comparisons 
' to the Russian .past -- autocracy, the service nobility, -the collective-farm 
peasantry as serfs -- are used metaphorically by Moshe.Lewin and are 
central to the analysis of Fbbert C. Tucker in &&n in Power: T k  
volution from Above, 1928-1941, 
46. Robert C. Tucker, "Introduction," Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen (eds.), 
eat Purge Trial (New York, 1965), p. xxix. This is essentially the 
argument of the second volume of his Stalin biography, as well as the view 
of Robert Conquest in' The Great Terror: Stal 
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(New York: Macmillan, 1968); T he Great Terror: A Reassessment (New 
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their chairs and habits could also encourage them to try 
and curtail the power of the very top and the 
personalized ruling style of the chief of the state -- and 
this .was p &ably a real, prospect the paranoid leader did 
not relish. 4 / 
The debates will continue, even .after the archives are completely 
opened, but already one might tentatively conclude that Stalin's initiation 
and personal direction of the Purges was the catalyst to thousands of 
smaller settlings -of scores. "In :the :context of deep and recurring social 
tensions the state gave the green light to resentments against the 
privileged, the intelligentsia, other ethnicities, outsiders. The requirement 
to find enemies, to blame and .punish worked .together with self-protection 
and self-promotion (and plain sadism) to expand the Purges into a political 
holocaust. At the end the Soviet Union resembled a ruined landscape, 
seriously weakened economically, intellectually, and militarily, but a t  the 
same -time -dominated by a towering state .apparatus made up of new loyal 
wparatchiki, disciplined by the .police,-and presided over by a single will. 
By ,the outbreak of-the .Second'World War the central .government, 
the military, the republics and local governments, the economic 
infrastructure had all'been -brutdly disciplined. Obedience and conformity 
had eliminated most initiative or originality. Ruling through his'like- 
minded lieutenants, Stalin relied on specialists whenever he needed 
expertise or greater competence. After decimating the high command of the 
armed forces, his control over his military was greater than Hitler over his, 
a t  least at the.beginning of the war. He intervened and interfered in both 
minute and major decisions, and was often abrupt and threatening, yet he 
was more willing to rely on his generals than was Hitler, who became 
progressively more involved with operational command and more 
47. Moshe Lewin, "Grappling with Stalinism," The Making of the 'Soviet 
Svstem, pp. 308-309. 
contemptuous of the military leaders. "Hitler's generals, writes Severyn 
Bialer, "exercised less influence on the decisions of their High Command at  
the moment they were most able to act effectively; Stalin's generals 
exercised more."48 Stalin stood a t  the center of all strategic. logistical, and 
political decisions. He was chairman of the State Defense Committee, which 
included the highest party officials (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, 
'Kaganovich, and later Voznesenskii andmMikoyan); the chairman of Stavka, 
the supreme military headquarters; General Secretary of the party and 
chairman of the Politburo; chairman of the Council of Ministers and People's 
Commissar of Defense. Real business often took place in late-night 
meetings at Stalin's apartment or dacha, and the exigencies of total war 
reinforced and accelerated the centralization of power.'49 
The victory over 'Nazism, which was at one and the same time 
convincingly identified with the superiority of the Soviet system, its organic 
link with rodina (the motherland), and the personal.genius of Stalin, 
provided the Communists with the kind of legitimacy and popular authority 
that had eluded them in the prewar.period. Russia and the Soviet Union 
melded in a single image. Patriotism and accommodation with established 
religious and national traditions, along with the toning down of 
revolutionary radicalism, contributed to a powerful -ideological amalgam that 
outlasted Stalin himself. The war became-the central moment of Soviet 
history for generations to come, eclipsing the revolution and the velikii 
48. Severyn Bialer, Stalin and His Genera L .  ls,.p. 43. "As supreme head of 
army command, Hitler was centrally involved in the formulation of day-to- 
day tactics in a way which occupied no other head of state during the 
Second World War. For the German army, this was catastrophic. The 
command structure which he had devised placed him in charge of both the 
general management of military campaigns and its detailed tactics." (Ian 
Kershaw, Hitler [London and New York: Longman, 19911, p. 175) 
'th S t a b  49. Djilas, Conversations m passim; A. I. Mikoyan, "V pervye 
mesiaty Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny," pp. 93~104. 
perelom of the early 1930s. And though there would be sporadic uses of 
repression and terror against individuals or- groups (the "Leningrad Affair" 
of 1947, the "Doctors' Plot" of 1953), as well as a pervasive fear that 
disciplined people into obedient silence, no.massive terror on the scale of 
1937 was employed after the war. 
Whatever benefits accrued to the Soviet system from the unity of 
decision-making at,the top must be weighed against the costs of 
overcentralization and the resultant paralysis lower down in the apparatus. 
In the years of the Cold War, as Stalin deteriorated physically and 
mentally, the entire country --.its<foreign-policy, internal politics, cultural 
life, and economic slowdown -- reflected the moods-of-its leader and was 
affected by his. growing isolation, arbitrariness, and ,inactivity. No one could 
feel secure. The ruling elite was concerned. with. plots, intrigues, the 
rivalries within Stalin7s closest associates, the rise and fall of clients and 
patrons. ' "All of' us around Stalin, " writes 'Khrushchev, '"were temporary 
people. "As long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were allowed to go 
on living and working. But the moment he stopped trusting you, Stalin 
would start to scrutinize -you. until the cup of. his *distrust overflowed. "50 
his last years Stalin turned against Molotov aria-Mikoyan, grew suspicious 
of Beria, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov. Khrushchev overheard 
him say, ,"I'm finished. I trust no-one, %not -even 
'Both Western and Soviet historians -wrestle with the vexing question 
of the source of the degeneration of the 'Soviet system, and in the years of 
Perestroika and glasnost' the dating .of its-origins has steadily been pushed 
back from the Stalin Revolution to the earliest years of Soviet Power. 
50. Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. by Strobe7Talbott (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1970), -p.'307. 
51. Ibid. 
Bolsheviks were cavalier in the revolutionary period about Western notions 
of democracy and confident that they had discovered a higher form. The 
revolution had, in a sense, been a struggle-between two distinct, and not 
necessarily incompatible, understandings of democracy -- one the 
conventional liberal idea of representative government based on periodic 
elections, guaranteed civil rights, and protection of minorities; the other, a 
sociologcal category encompassing the -lower classes. In 'Russianb"the 
democracy" W o k r a t i i a l  usually referred, not to the idea of limited 
representative government, but to those classes of the population that 
existed outside the propertied classes (isentsovoe obshchestvo) that had had 
the direct vote (benz) in the last two tsarist dumas. The democracy was 
the constituency of the socialist parties, that-part of the population 
. represented in soviets and factory committees, and "democracy" was 
understood as a government representative of the lower classes. The 
Bolshevik project after the seizure of power was to empower these classes, 
particularly workers, to promote -them socially .and politically, to the 
disadvantage of the old ruling elites. Though the replacement of party and 
bureaucratic power for Soviet power, along with the institution of 
managerial control instead of workers' .control in the factories, limited the 
actual input of much of the d-, the entry of workers, soldiers, and 
.peasants into the ruling institutions empowered significant numbers. At the 
same time the expansion and democratization of education, the privileging 
of the proletariat, the insistence that culture be accessible to the masses all 
worked to "democratize" the social and cultural order. Ultimately, the 
socially democratizing tendencies came up against the countervailing 
movements of centralizing state power, ending local autonomies, creating 
new hierarchies based less on class than on skill, education, position, and 
30 
political loyalty. Stalinism contained within i t  both of these contradictory 
tendencies with all the resulting tensions, and the periodic explosions of the 
newly-arrived against the "former people" and intellectuals are testimony to 
their incomplete resolution. By the time Stalin declared the advent of 
socialism in the USSR and the promulgation of the world's "most 
democratic" constitution, both democracy as representation and democracy 
as the empowering of the disenfranchised had-become casualties of his 
unlimited authoritarianism. 
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